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Introduction
While mobile telecommunications markets have largely been left unregulated in Europe until recently, they have started to draw regulators' and policy makers' attention in more recent times (see, e.g., European Commission, 2007) . Apart from more narrowly defined issues such as mobile number portability, mobile termination rates, and international roaming, an area of concern has also been the general competitiveness of the mobile telecommunications industry. For example, Ofcom and the UK Competition Commission have argued that the mobile telecommunications industry as a whole is not subject to effective competition, due to the oligopolistic industry configuration (see Competition Commission, 2003) . Since there is only a limited amount of radio spectrum available and as the fixed and common costs associated with mobile network investments are relatively high, mobile telecommunications markets have been argued to be natural oligopolies (see Gruber, 2001; Valletti, 2003) . Accordingly, concerns have been voiced by various regulatory and competition authorities about competition in mobile telecommunications markets (or, more precisely, the lack thereof), especially with respect to the potential for collusive behaviour.
In fact, as oligopolistic industries are often prone to collusion, it is important to analyse the market participants' conduct in these industries in more detail. Apart from factors such as the number of operators, barriers to entry, product differentiation, the firms' cost structures, and market transparency, one indicator for the firms' incentives to engage in collusive behaviour is the market's and the firms' demand elasticity (see, e.g., Carlton and Perloff, 2004) . If the market demand is relative inelastic, the firms' rewards from engaging in collusive conduct are relatively high, as prices can be increased without loosing much custom. In contrast, a relatively elastic demand im-4 plies that the additional profit from collusion is relatively low. In addition, a high firm-specific elasticity of demand implies that deviating from a collusive agreement is relatively profitable (as a small price decrease generates a relatively high increase in the quantity sold) so that collusion is more likely to break down due to the "cheating problem".
Moreover, demand elasticities have also been the subject of debate in various hearings on price regulation and the allocation of common costs, for which demand elasticities play an important role (e.g., for Ramsey pricing). Hence, as demand elasticities have become a subject of debate, the number of studies that estimate demand elasticities has also been increasing, some of which are reviewed below. This paper adds to this growing literature. However, in contrast to most other research which is based on aggregate market data we had access to firm-specific data from three different competitors in the Austrian mobile telecommunications market between January 1998 and March 2002. These three firms who are the three largest mobile operators in Austria account for around 90% of the Austrian market for mobile telecommunications. In our analysis, we will use firm specific data on prices and quantities for these firms and analyse price elasticities for mobile telecommunications services. In more detail, we will first analyse demand elasticities for different market segments, namely business customers and private consumers. Moreover, we also distinguish between prepaid and postpaid contracts in the case of private households. Our results suggest that the elasticity of demand is higher for business customers than for private consumers. Moreover, postpaid consumers appear to have a more elastic demand than postpaid and prepaid consumers taken together, which suggests that prepaid customers have a lower elasticity of demand. Secondly, we analyse firm-specific demand elasticities for the three operators, yielding short-run elasticities between -0.26 5 and -0.40 and long-run elasticities between -0.47 and -1.1. While these findings are in line with evidence from other countries (see, e.g., New Zealand Commerce Commission, 2003), they also indicate that demand elasticities may be different for different operators. This, in turn, suggests that pricing behaviour (especially mark-ups) may be quite different between firms.
Finally, the estimation of demand elasticities also helps to determine the effects that consumer protection measures have on consumer surplus. Given the European Commission's increasing focus on consumer protection, it becomes more important to understand how different groups of consumers (e.g., business customers versus private consumers) are affected by consumer protection measures.
The remainder of the paper is now organised as follows: The next section provides an overview over empirical studies of demand elasticities in mobile telecommunications markets before section 3 offers some basic facts on the Austrian mobile telecommunications market and its historical development.
In section 4 we describe the data used and present our empirical specifications for the demand equations. Finally, our main results and conclusions are summarised in section 5.
Brief Review of the Empirical Literature
Empirical studies on demand elasticities for mobile markets have, in principle, been using two different approaches. While the first approach is based on highly aggregated data on country or regional level, a second method to measure price elasticities relies on individual or survey data of consumer behaviour.
Independently of whether aggregated or individual data has been used most studies have found relatively moderate price elasticities . Hausman 6 (1999) and (2000), for example, finds a price elasticity of access to mobile services of -0.51, using aggregate data on 30 U.S. markets for the period 1988 to 1993. Analysing the price elasticity of subscription using data on 64 different countries Ahn and Lee (1999) A quite different approach to analyse conduct in mobile markets has been carried out by Parker and Röller (1997) and Grzybowski (2004) . Both studies apply structural models in order to examine the competitve behaviour of mobile operators. While Parker and Röller (1997) find an own-price elasticity of -2.5 using data on the United States covering the period 1984 -1988 , Grzybowski (2004 (2003) and by Manfrim and da Silva (2007) for a number of additional studies.
In order to analyse the price elasticities of demand for the Austrian mobile telecommunications market, and in contrast to existing studies, we (i) use data on firm specific tariffs and (ii) apply dynamic panel techniques. By these means we are able to distinguish between short-and long-run elasticities and to distinguish between consumer behaviour at the firm level.
The Austrian Market for Mobile Telecommunications
In contrast to most other European countries, the Austrian market for mo- In total we have information on 37 different tariffs offered by the three operators mentioned. These tariffs comprise 13 business tariffs, and 15 postpaid and 9 prepaid tariffs designed for private consumers (see Table 1 for a summary of the data). In addition, information on the price index has been gathered from official statistics of Austria.
*** Insert Table 1 about here *** For each of these 37 tariffs the variable 'total number of outgoing minutes' measures the monthly traffic (Q). The variable consists of the sum of all outgoing call minutes, independent of the exact type of service (except for SMS or data services). Hence, the variable represents an aggregate over various services (such as on-net, off-net, mobile to fixed, and international calls) within a specific tariff. To analyse price elasticities we have calculated the average traffic per subscriber (q), using the ratio Q/T N et, where T Net is the number of subscribers within a given tariff.
Furthermore, we had to use an average call price (P ), which has been constructed by dividing the total revenue for each tariff by the total number of outgoing minutes for that tariff. While mobile markets are characterised by price differentiation between peak and off-peak times, more detailed data has not been available to us. To obtain real prices P has been deflated by the Austrian consumer price index. Furthermore, information on the firms' (total) subscriber bases (T Net) as well as time and firm dummies have been used as explanatory variables. All variables but the dummies are in logarithmic forms (see Table 2 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics).
Specifications
A standard approach for the estimation of demand elasticities in telecommunications is derived from the so-called Houthakker-Taylor model, which takes possible path dependencies of consumption into account (see Houthakker and Taylor, 1970) . In mobile telecommunications, consumption in any given month should depend on consumption in previous months because consumers tend to conclude contracts that last for more than a month. In fact, in Austria the standard contract duration is 12 months. Even without fixed contract durations (as with prepaid contracts) switching costs matter for consumption decisions (see, e.g., Buehler, Dewenter and Haucap, 2006) . Furthermore, consumer behaviour may only change gradually if consumers form habits about their calling patterns. This may also be supported by the fact that many consumers only "discover" price changes once they receive their monthly bill or once they purchase a new prepaid card. This would also suggest that some consumers do not immediately react to price changes, but only slowly. For these reasons we expect long-run elasticities to differ from short-run elasticities, as consumers may only react with some time lag. If consumers' calling behaviour is shaped by habits and routines, demand is expected to be more elastic in the long-run when consumers change their consumption patterns.
According to the Houthakker-Taylor model, demand q at time t can be expressed as q t = q φ t−1 p η t where p t denotes price at time t (see Taylor, 1994) . Hence, the model allows us to distinguish between short-run and long-run elasticities of demand where short-run price elasticity is determined by η, whereas the long-run price elasticity equals η/(1 − φ). Taking into account the panel structure of the data, the following specification can be derived:
where q it is the average quantity demanded for tariff i at time t, p jt is the respective average price for the tariff under consideration (j = i) and all other tariffs (j = i). Furthermore, x it,k 's are k additional explanatory variables, ε it is an error term, and β, the γ j 's and the δ k 's are the parameters to be estimated. Hence, y i is the short-run own price elasticity and the y j 's are the short-run cross-price elasticities (for j = i). However, since usual panel data techniques lead to biased results in this case, not only because prices are endogenous, but also because of the lagged endogenous variable q it−1 , a dynamic panel analysis is more appropriate. Applying a first difference transformation of equation (1) leads to
which can be consistently estimated using a GMM approach as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991 Kaiser and Wright, 2006) . The intuition would be that cost shocks will affect instruments and endogenous variables in similar ways without affecting demand for the .
In the following, we will estimate both market demand elasticities for different market segments and firm-specific demand elasticities for the three mobile operators. In order to estimate market demand elasticities we will divide the Austrian mobile telecommunications market into a business and a private consumer segment. In the latter case, we will furthermore also distinguish between prepaid and postpaid tariffs.
3 For all our estimations we will use the same data described above. However, the 37 tariffs will be divided into different groups for the two estimation strategies to identify both market and firm-specific demand elasticities.
In order to address the risk of regressions being spurious we first have applied panel unit root tests for the variables used in this study. While the pooled panel estimator yields consistent estimates even if some of the variables are integrated of order one (or higher) and also independently of the existence of a cointegrating relation (see Phillips and Moon, 1999) , only long-run relationships can be analysed using the integrated variables in this case. Using lagged variables is not appropriate though. Thus, the first step is to test the samples against unit roots using a non-parametric approach as suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999) . 4 The authors suggest to choose a test-statistic by Fisher (1932) where the p-values of single unit root tests (π i ) from each cross-sectional unit i = 1, . . . , N are used to calculate the
. In order to account for possible autocorrelated and heteroscdastic errors, Phillips-Perron tests (see Phillips 1987 and Phillips and Perron, 1988 ) have been applied to each time series to calculate respective p-values. 5 We have tested for unit roots both when tariffs are grouped into market segments (business, postpaid and prepaid customers) and when tariffs are sorted by firms (One, T-Mobile and Mobilkom). As one can see, Table 3 in the Appendix, which provides the unit root test statistics, there is little evidence that the variables are integrated. In all but one case (lnT Net for Mobilkom) the null hypothesis (existence of unit roots) can be rejected. However, one may note that looking at the individual tariff data some of the tariff time series can be found to be integrated of order one. This is not a problem for our analysis, however, as we estimate first differences as specified in equation (2).
6
First, we have analysed demand elasticities for both business customers and private consumers, which we consider to be at least different market segments if not entirely different markets. Since estimating all cross-price elasticities, as indicated in equation (2), has lead to manifest problems of multicollinearity, we had to confine ourselves to the estimations of own-price elasticities only. We consider this less dramatic than it may appear at first sight because most consumers will only respond to price changes within their chosen tariff, as they cannot easily switch to possibly less expensive tariffs, at least not in the short-run, due to contract duration and other switching costs. Of course, our estimated long-run elasticities may be underestimated 5 The number of lags used for each series has been calculated by l = int(4 · (T/100) (2/9) ) (see Newey and West, 1987) , where T is the number of observations.
6 The problem of unit roots is typically not addressed when telecommunications demand is estimated. For example, both Das and Srinivasan (1999) and Ahn and Lee (1999) neglect the problem of non-stationary variables so that spurious correlations may lead to biased results.
as cross-price effects have been neglected. This means that the true long-run elasticities should be higher than our estimates.
As prices are clearly endogenous, as may be the size of the subscriber base, we have to instrument both explanatory variables in our equations to be estimated.
7 For our estimations of the demand elasticity of business customers, we use the average price and subscriber base of prepaid contracts as instruments. Conversely, to estimate the demand elasticities for the two private consumer market segments (prepaid and postpaid) we use the average price and subscriber base of business customers as instruments. The reason is that we expect the different market segments' demand functions to be largely independent from each other, while, at the same time, we expect cost shocks to affect both market segments in similar ways. Hence, we consider these instruments to be valid. 8 To estimate firm-specific demand elasticities, we have also used the average prices and subscriber bases of prepaid contracts as instruments for the respective variables of business customers and average business prices and subscriber bases to instrument private consumer variables. As can be seen from Tables 4 and 5 Sargan tests cannot reject orthogonality of the instruments at the usual signifcance levels. Table 4 presents the results of our analysis for different market segments.
Results
Almost all relevant coefficients are statistically significant and show the expected signs. The coefficients ∆ ln p t can be interpreted as short-run demand elasticities. If business customers and private consumers are considered to be entirely different markets (and not only market segments), the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as market demand elasticities. In line with almost all other empirical studies of telecommunications demand, the demand for mobile telecommunications services in Austria is found to be relatively inelastic in the short run. However, business customers have a more elastic demand (-0.33) than private consumers (-0.14).
9 Among the private consumers demand appears to be more elastic for customers on postpaid contracts (-0.22) than for prepaid contract customers where we do not find a statitically significant elasticity. While it may appear somewhat surprising that business consumers have a more elastic demand (given that a firm's employees ususally do not pay for calls themselves so that a principal-agent problem results), the lower demand elasticity for private consumers may be due to the low demand elasticity that prepaid consumers exhibit. In fact, the long-run elasticities of demand are roughly the same for business customers and private postpaid consumers. Moreover, principal-agent problems should be less severe in small and family firms which may exhibit a larger elasticity of demand.
Regarding prepaid tariffs, we were unable to find a significant demand elasticity. A potential reason may be that many (if not most) consumers appear to purchase a prepaid card (usually bundled with a mobile telephone) in order to receive calls and not to place calls. Furthermore, subscriber numbers are less reliable than for either business or postpaid customers because consumers do not have to cancel their contract once they decide not to use their prepaid account any longer. Hence, the subscriber number for prepaid consumers may be overstated in our sample (and the operators' accounts, respectively), and, therefore, the traffic per active subscriber understated.
As expected, long-run elasticities are higher for all market segments in line with the reasoning provided above.
Also note that the past month's traffic positively affects current traffic numbers. As mentioned before, this is not surprising given habitual consumer behaviour. Since q t is defined as q t ≡ Q t /T N et, a negative coefficient for ln T Net means that the average quantity consumed per subscriber is decreasing with an increasing subscriber base. One reason should be that the marginal customer consumes less than the average customer. This means, that additional consumers (who are relatively late adapters) use their mobile telephone less than the early adapters. The finding may also suggest that firm-specific network effects (should they exist, maybe due to a differentiation between on-net and off-net tariffs), are not so strong that additional customers would lead to an increase in the average quantity consumed.
10 *** Insert Table 4 about here *** Analysing firms instead of market segments leads to quite different results, as elasticities can now be interpreted as firm-specific rather than market demand elasticities. As can be seen from Table 5 , short-run as well as longrun elasticities tend to be a bit higher on average than those calculated for market segments. The reasoning behind these differences is that firms compete with each other over similar tariffs (i.e. prepaid, postpaid and business tariffs). Price changes should therefore lead to stronger variations in shortrun demand and also result in higher churn rates which in turn increases 10 Note that with strong network effects adding another consumer could lead to an increase in the average quantity consumed. To explore this possibility, we have not only used T Net, but also the variable Net (which is the subscriber base per tariff). However, neither use of the tariff specific subscriber base (Net) nor use of the firm's total subscriber base (T Net) has produced evidence for such strong network effects.
long-run demand elasticities. Again, long-run elasticities are, as expected, considerably higher than short-run numbers. For example the average price elasticity of demand is about -1.1 for T-Mobile, which is relatively high compared to other studies. Moreover, subscriber bases have, again, a negative and statictically significant impact on demand per subscriber. Table 5 about here ***
*** Insert

Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the demand for mobile telecommunications services in Austria. Dynamic panel data techniques have been applied in order to estimate short-and long-run price elasticities. In contrast to most other research we had access to firm-specific data on 37 different tariffs from three competitors in three market segments (business customers, postpaid and prepaid private consumers) between January 1998 and March 2002.
These three firms who are the three largest mobile operators in Austria have accounted for around 90% of the Austrian mobile telecommunications market for the period of our analysis.
First, we have analysed short-run demand elasticities for business customers and private consumers and have, in a second step, also distinguished between prepaid and postpaid contracts in the case of private households.
Our results suggest that business customers have a more elastic demand than private consumers. Among the private consumers demand appears to be more elastic for customers on postpaid contracts than for prepaid contract customers where we do not find a statistically significant elasticity. Long-run elasticities are higher for all market segments which is consistent with our expectations as habitual behaviour with respect to consumer calling habits will only change slowly. Furthermore, consumers cannot easily switch to possibly less expensive tariffs in the short-run due to contract duration and other switching costs. And finally consumers may also only react slowly to price changes as they only "discover" the new prices once they receive their monthly bill in the case of postpaid customers and possibly even later in the case of prepaid customers.
Moreover, we have analysed firm-specific demand elasticities for the three operators, yielding short-run elasticities between -0.26 and -0.40 and long-run elasticities between -0.46 and -1.1. The differences between the operators' demand elasticities suggests that mark-ups between firms will also differ, which should be taken into account for competition analysis purposes.
Finally, we have found subscriber bases to have a negative and statictically significant impact on demand per subscriber in all of our regressions, which may suggest that additional consumers (who are relatively late adapters) use their mobile telephone less than the early adapters. In contrast, the past month's traffic positively affects current traffic numbers in our regressions which supports the notion that habitual consumer behavioûr may also play a role in mobile telecommunications as suggested by Taylor (1994). Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent z-statistics are given in parenthesis.
Standard errors for long-run elasticities calculated using the delta method (see Greene,2003) . Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent z-statistics are given in parenthesis.
Standard errors for long-run elasticities calculated using the delta method (see Greene,2003) .
